Dark Pool Regulation:  Fostering Innovation and Competition While Protecting Investors by Crudele, Nicholas
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 4
2015
Dark Pool Regulation: Fostering Innovation and
Competition While Protecting Investors
Nicholas Crudele
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas Crudele, Dark Pool Regulation: Fostering Innovation and Competition While Protecting Investors, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com.
L. (2015).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol9/iss2/4
DARK POOL REGULATION: FOSTERING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION WHILE
PROTECTING INVESTORS
INTRODUCTION
A fight has broken out between long-time Wall Street associates, the
stock exchanges, and the broker-dealers; regulators around the globe are
taking sides.1 The fight is over dark pools, the off-exchange marketplaces
where broker-dealers execute trades without displaying the price quotes to
the public.2 As these pools gain more and more of the daily trading
volume,3 regulators are weighing the benefits of increased competition
against the potential risks.4
Spawned from the stock market deregulation brought on by the
Securities Act Amendments of 1975 (1975 Amendments),5 dark pools were
originally developed to allow institutional investors6 to execute large orders
without causing the markets to move.7 As trading became increasingly
electronic with the advent of the internet (and moved away from the
traditional exchanges), dark pools became increasingly popular as a way to
hide institutional orders from the predatory activities of high-frequency
traders (HFT).8 Today however, there are growing concerns that this
increased activity in the dark is hurting the markets and investors.9
1. Scott Patterson, Dark Pool Brawl Breaks Out, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2013, 9:26 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/04/17/nyse-credit-suisse-spat-shines-light-on-dark-pools/.
2. While dark pools can be used to trade a variety of financial products including stock
options and corporate bonds, this Note will focus on pools that are used for NMS securities
trading as defined in 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(46). Id.
3. Dark pools accounted for nearly 14.7% of total equity volume, up from 11.4% in 2010 and
6.45% in 2008. Phil Albinus, Dark Pools Offer Better Prices but Trade Size is Dropping: Report,
TRADER MAGAZINE.COM (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/dark-pools-
offer-better-prices-but-size-order-is-dropping-report-111790-1.html.
4. Stephen Joyce, SEC Contemplating Effects of Dark Pools As It Considers Market
Structure Reforms, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 768 (2013).
5. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 94 (amended 1975);
Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation: High Frequency Trading, Direct Electronic Access and
Dark Pools, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 2011, at 3.
6. Institutional investors include pension funds, banks, broker-dealers, and insurance
companies who typically trade large quantities of stock during a single trade. 16 C.F.R. §
802.64(a) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 230.215(a) (2014).
7. Stock prices are a function of supply and demand. The more investors want to buy a stock,
the higher the price will go. Conversely, less demand for a stock will decrease stock price. If an
investor shows the market they want to buy or sell a large quantity of shares, the market would
move against them and they would receive a worse price. Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High
Frequency Trading, and Other Market Structure Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec.,
Ins., and Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 58 (2009)
[hereinafter Brigagliano statement] (statement of James. A. Brigagliano, Co-Acting Dir., Div. of
Trading & Markets, SEC).
8. High-frequency traders use sophisticated algorithms that trade at extreme rates of speed in
order to exploit market disparities. Karmel, supra note 5, at 3. See also Richard Finger, High
Frequency Trading: Is It A Dark Force Against Ordinary Human Traders And Investors?,
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The stock exchanges, which risk losing revenue the more trades are
executed away from their platforms,10 argue that these dark pools reduce
liquidity and increase price disparity in the public or lit markets.11 They
want stronger regulations, if not a complete ban, on dark trading.12 Dark
pool operators defend their systems, saying they provide a needed service to
their institutional clients who risk adverse price movements when trades are
displayed.13 They also argue that the competition has lowered costs to
investors, particularly retail investors.14 With varying results from the
academic community on whether dark pools actually hurt the markets,
regulators need to determine whether the increased competition in the
securities markets is beneficial to investors or whether these dark pools are
hurting price discovery and liquidity and need further regulation.15
This Note will explore the regulatory environment surrounding dark
pools and the implications of proposed regulations. Part I provides an
introduction to dark pools, including why they were developed, who
operates them, why they are used, and by whom. It will also give the
regulatory history behind their rise. Part II discusses the major issues
causing regulators to pursue stricter controls on dark pool trading. Part III
describes the proposed and implemented international responses to dark
pools and their effects on the markets. Part IV reviews the current U.S.
regulations and the proposals of the Securities and Exchange Commission
FORBES (Sept. 30, 2013, 8:41 AM), http://onforb.es/1eTNjQa (explaining the tactics used by high-
frequency traders).
9. Dave Michaels, Stock Exchanges Seek Curbs on Dark Pools to Fight Exodus,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Jun. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-04/stock-exchanges-
seek-curbs-on-dark-pools-to-fight-exodus.html (citing concerns from the U.S. stock exchanges
that dark pools are creating higher costs and volatility, and also noting that dark pools account for
almost fifteen percent of the daily trading volume in NMS securities).
10. Juliet Lapidos, How Does a Stock Exchange Make Money?, SLATE.COM (Feb. 16, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2011/02/how_does_a_stock_exchange
_make_money.html (explaining how stock markets make money by charging commissions on
shares traded and how the increase in competition has driven trading volume down, thus lowering
revenue).
11. Computerized Trading Venues: What Should the Rules of the Road Be?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. 27–28 (2012) (statement of Joseph Mecane, Exec. Vice President & Head of U.S. Equities,
NYSE Euronext); Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High Frequency Trading, and Other Market
Structure Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the Comm. on Banking,
Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 9–10 (2009) [hereinafter Hatheway statement] (statement
of Frank Hatheway, Chief Economist, NASDAQ OMX).
12. Laura Marcinek & Whitney Kisling, Former NYSE CEO Thain Says Stock Dark Pools
Should Be Closed, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
09-17/former-nyse-ceo-thain-says-stock-dark-pools-should-be-eliminated.html.
13. Joan E. Solsman, Goldman Sachs Defends Dark Pools, Short Selling, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
27, 2009, 2:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125665689267210559; Cyrus Sanati, Credit
Suisse Banker Defends Those ‘Dark Pools’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2009, 9:00 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/02/credit-suisse-banker-defends-those-dark-pools/comment-
page-1/?_r=0.
14. Solsman, supra note 13; Sanati, supra note 13.
15. Joyce, supra note 4.
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(SEC) and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) regarding
dark pools. Part V discusses the implications for U.S. markets if the SEC
were to follow international regulators by curbing dark pool activity or
pursue a full ban. It is the position of this Note that there is insufficient
evidence that dark pools are hurting the market place, and the SEC should
continue to focus on increasing competition and access in a fair and open
market.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ON DARK POOL
REGULATION
The mission of the SEC is to protect investors while maintaining fair,
orderly, and efficient markets.16 In pursuing these principles, the SEC has
adopted regulations that have greatly increased competition in the stock
market and significantly lowered the costs.17 While this push toward
competitive markets has allowed for the development of national securities
exchanges,18 it has also led to the growth of competing platforms called
alternative trading systems (ATS).19 These trading systems effectively act
like exchanges, matching buyers and sellers of securities in a central
location.20 However, ATSs are registered as broker-dealers and are subject
to regulations which govern them as such.21 Unlike the national securities
exchanges, which publicly display the best quote for both the buy and sell
side of the market, ATSs are not required to do so.22 Some choose to
display this information to the public, but others do not.23 A dark pool is a
type of ATS that matches buyers and sellers, but does not display pre-trade
quotes outside of the system.24 While there have been many acts and
16. What We Do, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
17. Brigagliano statement, supra note 7, at 57.
18. A national securities exchange is registered under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 with the SEC. The New York Stock Exchange and The NASDAQ Stock Market are two
examples of national securities exchanges. Division of Trading and Markets: Exchanges, Other
Markets, Broker-Dealers, Clearing Agencies, Transfer Agents, and NRSROs, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).
19. Brigagliano statement, supra note 7, at 57.
20. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844, 70845
(Dec. 22, 1998).
21. Gabriel Matus, The Regulation of Alternative Trading Systems: Market Fragmentation and
the New Market Structure, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583, 596 (2001).
22. ATSs are only required to display their best priced orders if they exceed five percent of the
trading volume of an individual stock. SEC, SPECIAL STUDY: ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION
NETWORKS AND AFTER-HOURS TRADING (2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ecnafter.htm.
23. Electronic Communication Networks (ECN) are a subset of ATSs that display quotes to
the public markets. LAURA TUTTLE, SEC, ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS: DESCRIPTION OF
ATS TRADING INNATIONALMARKET SYSTEM STOCKS 2 n.8 (2013) [hereinafter DESCRIPTION OF
ATS TRADING].
24. Trading interest is considered dark primarily when it is not included in the consolidated
quotation data for NMS stocks. Consolidated market data is the primary vehicle for public price
transparency in the U.S. equity markets and it includes real-time information on the best-priced
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regulations that have contributed to the competitive securities markets in
the United States, this Note will focus on the key regulations that have led
to the growth of dark pools:25 the 1975 Amendments,26 Regulation of
Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems (Regulation ATS),27 and
Regulation NMS.28
A. SECURITIESACTAMENDMENTS OF 1975
Prior to the 1970’s, stock trading was dominated by the national
securities exchanges, with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) having a
virtual monopoly.29 After a surge in trading volume caused a crisis on Wall
Street in the 1960’s, Congress was forced to review the structure of the
securities markets.30 Among other things, the reports commissioned to
review and provide recommendations noted the anti-competitive nature of
the fixed commission system,31 concerns about the negative effects the
increased holdings of institutional investors were having on the auction
market system, and price discrepancies between the national securities
quotations, which trades may be executed, and real-time reports of trades as they execute. Dark
pools may vary in the degree to which they display information even within their systems.
Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 61208, 61209 (proposed Nov. 13, 2009);
DESCRIPTION OFATS TRADING, supra note 23, at 2 n.8.
25. See, e.g., Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. 48290, 48303 n.170 (Sept. 12, 1996);
Order Directing the Exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Submit
a Decimalization Implementation Plan Pursuant to Section 11A(a)(3)(B) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 65 Fed. Reg. 5003 (Jan. 28, 2000).
26. See generally Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 94
(amended 1975).
27. See generally Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg.
70844, 70846 (Dec. 22, 1998).
28. See generally Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496 (June 29, 2005).
29. Megan Grove, Cincinnati Stock Exchange: The Birth of the Modern Stock Market,
CINCINNATI STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.cincinnatistockexchange.us/the-birth-of-the-modern-
stock-market (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (noting that the New York Stock Exchange had close to
90% of market share).
30. Stock trading volume increased from five million shares a day in 1965 to twelve million
shares a day in 1968, overwhelming brokers’ ability to transfer and keep records of the securities.
The back offices of brokerages were so overwhelmed that at one point the stock markets were
forced to stop trading on Wednesday and shorten trading hours. Large fines, increased interest
payments to customers, and costly computer upgrades forced six brokers out of business. Wyatt
Wells, Certificates and Computers: The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, 74 BUS. HIST.
REV.193, 214–215 (2000); Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Comm’r, SEC, Address at the Joint Securities
Conference: The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Self-Regulation and the National Market
System (Nov. 18, 1975), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/111875loomis.pdf.
31. In the fixed rate system, prices and services allowed by its members were set in the rules of
the exchanges which all of its members were required to follow. The New York Stock Exchange,
for example, did not allow its members to offer volume discounts and members needed permission
from the exchange before they could execute a transaction of a listed stock off of the exchange.
Members of the exchanges therefore competed against each other based on services provided, not
price. Richard W. Jennings, The New York Stock Exchange and the Commission Rate Struggle, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1119–20 (1965). See also A.A. Somer, Jr., Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the
Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices: The New Breath of Competition (May 15, 1975),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/051575sommer-1.pdf.
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exchanges.32 Designed to increase competition in the stock markets and
eliminate these issues, the 1975 Amendments set up the “framework in
which competing markets would be linked together in ways that would
produce the best prices and efficient executions.”33
Prior to the 1975 Amendments, there were no requirements for stock
exchanges to disseminate information to the public, nor were there any
requirements as to what information they would supply or who would get it
if they did.34 This limited public access to the information and allowed for
wide price discrepancies for the same stock on different exchanges.35
Without a linkage between markets, the best prices on one exchange were
not seen by other exchanges, thus hindering the ability of investors to get
the best price.36 The stock exchanges, especially the NYSE, also set strict
rules and commission structures, which limited their members. Among
other rules, the NYSE imposed a strict commission system for all trading of
NYSE-listed stocks and required its members to obtain permission before
executing a transaction off of the exchange floor.37 The NYSE also required
non-members to pay a substantially higher rate for transactions.38
The 1975 Amendments aimed to increase competition and fair access to
the markets by restricting the barriers to entry imposed by the stock
exchanges.39 It also called for a national securities market.40 Under the 1975
32. Congress and the exchanges commissioned several major reports to study the stock
markets and propose solutions to the growing volume of trades. The Martin Report, which was
commissioned by the NYSE and written by an independent unpaid advisor, recommended a
central market system to provide a single auction market. The SEC rejected the single market idea
and instead opted for a system of competing exchanges. Federal Legislation to Enhance
Competition in the Securities Industry, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 640–41 (1975); Philip A.
Loomis, Jr., Comm’r, SEC, Address to the Florida Security Dealers Association: The
Implementation of the Central Market System (Nov. 1, 1974), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1974/ 110174loomis.pdf. See generally Arthur Levitt, Imagine
an Investor: Washington’s Historical Role in Shaping the Industry Through Regulation and
Legislation, CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ONMODERN EQUITYMARKETS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
BY FINANCIAL INDUSTRY EXPERTS 21, 22–23 (2010) (noting that although the SEC recognized
the potential for price discrepancies among competing markets it was more concerned with the
monopolistic nature of the NYSE).
33. SEC, supra note 22.
34. Preserving and Strengthening the National Market System for Securities in the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2000)
[hereinafter Levitt statement] (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
35. Grove, supra note 29; Levitt statement, supra note 34.
36. Levitt statement, supra note 34.
37. Jennings, supra note 31, 1119–20.
38. Id. at 1119.
39. Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket Competition and Monopoly Power In the U.S. Stock Markets,
1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 297–98 (2007).
40. The national market system as we know it today provides both the prices of the stocks sold
in real time as well as pre-trade price transparency. Joel Hasbrouck, George Sofianos & Deborah
Sosebee, New York Stock Exchange Systems and Trading Procedures 12 (NYSE, Working Paper
No. 93-01, 1993) [hereinafter NYSE Systems and Trading Procedures], available at
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhasbrou/Research/Working%20Papers/NYSE.PDF (referring to SEC
Rule 11Ac1-1 (b)).
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Amendments, the stock exchanges were required to set up a national market
system where price quotes could be seen by all interested parties with
limited restrictions.41 The SEC was instructed to create a system which
would maintain fair and orderly markets that tie together buying and selling
interest, giving investors the best possible execution of their orders,
regardless of where the order was placed.42 While Congress did not
specifically say how the system was to function, it did give five key
objectives: (1) economically efficient executions; (2) fair competition; (3)
the availability of market information; (4) best execution; and (5) direct
interaction among investor orders.43
Central to the issues facing the stock markets today, including dark
pools, was the SEC’s decision to develop a system that focused on
competition among all the market participants.44 Spurning a
recommendation in the Martin Report to develop a system with a single
central location, the SEC opted to establish one with many competing
exchanges believing the increased competition would benefit investors.45
The establishment of the national market system as well as the abolition of
the fixed rate system allowed brokers to compete equally both on price and
service, paving the way for ATSs and dark pools.46
B. REGULATIONATS
While the establishment of a national market system greatly reduced
price discrepancy between exchanges, it also had an unforeseen impact on
institutional traders, particularly as technology improved.47 In the
41. Exchanges can charge “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory fees” for their quotes but
they cannot charge fees that “would restrict the wide availability of their information to investors.”
Levitt statement, supra note 34, at n.10.
42. The Future of the Securities Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. and Inv. of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 27 (2003) (statement of William H.
Donaldson, Chairman, SEC).
43. Id.
44. Lanny Schwartz, Suggestions for Procedural Reform in Securities Market Regulation, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 409, 413–14 (2007).
45. Somer, supra note 31, at 15–16; Future Structure of the Securities Markets, 37 Fed. Reg.
5286, 5286–88 (1972); WILLIAMMCCHESNEYMARTIN, JR., THE SECURITIESMARKETS 4 (1971).
46. Karmel, supra note 5.
The rise in dark pools began with the deregulation of the securities exchanges in 1975.
Prior to 1975, dark pools were not possible because maintenance of fixed commission
rates came with a constraint prohibiting exchange members from trading exchange-
listed securities off the exchange board . . . . In 1975, however, the fixed commission
regime ended and so did the ban on off-exchange trading in various situations, opening
the door for off-exchange venues such as dark pools.
Id.
47. Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 61208, 61208–09 n.4 (proposed
Nov. 13, 2009).
[A] significant implicit cost for large investors (who often represent the consolidated
investments of many individuals) is the price impact that their large trades can have on
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beginning, large institutional trades could be negotiated off the trading
floor, or “upstairs.”48 These transactions were done privately between the
buyer and seller and reported to the stock exchange floor and national
market system once it was final.49 Large block trades50 could also be
“worked” by market makers by breaking the order into pieces and sending
them into the market as smaller trades.51 Both methods allowed the
institutional trader to mask the size of the order until the full execution was
complete, therefore having less of an impact on the markets.52 But with the
shift to electronic exchanges in the 1990’s and the growth of HFT, it
became harder for these institutional trades to be disguised.53
In response to the change in the market and their desire to cater to
institutional investors, broker-dealers developed in-house systems that
match large orders between their customers or their own trading book.54
Customers in these dark pools anonymously enter their orders and are
matched with other orders in the system.55 Unlike national securities
exchanges, which tend to rely on high-frequency trading for liquidity and
are barred from erecting barriers to entry by regulation, dark pools can cater
to the needs of institutional investors and limit access to the pools.56 This
not only allows the institutional investor to input trades without fear that the
market will detect and go against them, but also reduces the possibility that
the brokers themselves will jump in front of an investor’s order, or “front
run.”57
the market. Indeed, disclosure of these large orders can reduce the likelihood of their
being filled. Consequently, large investors often seek ways to interact with order flow
and participate in price competition without submitting a limit order that would display
the full extent of their trading interest to the market. Among the ways large investors
can achieve this objective are: (1) [t]o have their orders represented on the floor of an
exchange market; (2) to submit their orders to a market center that offers a limit order
book with a reserve size feature; or (3) to use a trading mechanism that permits some
form of ‘hidden’ interest to interact with the other side of the market.
Id.
48. Donald B. Keim & Ananth Madhavan, The Upstairs Market for Large-Block
Transactions: Analysis and Measurement of Price Effects, 9 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 1, 2 (1996).
49. Id.
50. The NYSE defined block orders as a trade of 10,000 shares or $200,000. NYSE Systems
and Trading Procedures, supra note 40, at 4–5.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Steve Thel, $850,000 In Six Minutes—The Mechanics Of Securities Manipulation, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 219, 225–26 (1994).
53. SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS 208 (2012).
54. Id.; Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the Spotlight on the
Security and Exchange Commission’s Regulatory Proposal Concerning Dark Pools of Liquidity,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1034–37 (2010).
55. Hatch, supra note 54, at 1037.
56. Bob Pisani, ICE CEO: New Champion of the Little Guy?, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2013, 4:56 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101172896.
57. Schumpeter, Shining a Light on Dark Pools, ECONOMIST.COM (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/08/exchange-share-trading.
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As the stock markets relied on automation to execute trades in the
1990’s, the SEC recognized that new technologies created a greater number
of investment and execution choices, reduced costs, and increased market
efficiency.58 However, it also recognized that the technological changes had
left the regulations “ill-equipped to respond to innovations” and raised
concerns about fair access, full price disclosure, manipulation, and fraud.59
Mindful of the increased use of technology by broker-dealers, which
provided investors with a growing array of services at lower prices, the SEC
adopted regulations aimed at ATSs to not only strengthen the public
securities markets, but also to encourage innovation.60 In particular, market
participants developed a variety of ATSs that provided services traditionally
offered solely by national securities exchanges.61 At the time, the SEC
estimated that ATSs accounted for over twenty percent of over-the-counter
stocks and four percent of NYSE securities.62 Determined to continue
promoting fair, efficient, and transparent markets while also addressing the
gap in regulation and concerns about the increased use of ATSs, the SEC
adopted Regulation ATS.63
In the regulation, the SEC distinguished between national securities
exchanges and ATSs, and brought ATSs under regulatory authority.64
Under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),
national securities exchanges are required to register with the SEC upon
approval that their governing rules were designed, among other things, to
prevent fraud and manipulation, remove impediments to a free and open
market, promote just and equitable trade, and protect investors and the
public interest.65 The Exchange Act also barred them from unfair
discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.66 Regulation
ATS reinterpreted exchanges to exclude systems that only routed orders to
other facilities for execution, were operated by a single registered market
maker to display its own quotes and orders to its customers, and systems
that allow persons to enter orders for execution against the bids and offers
of a single dealer.67 These exemptions separated ATSs from national
58. Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. 30485, 30488 (June 4, 1997).
59. Id. at 30486.
60. The SEC acknowledged that the current regulatory framework, designed decades earlier,
did not envision many of the trading and business technologies being used. Regulation of
Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844, 70910 (Dec. 22, 1998).
61. Id. at 70845.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 70871.
64. Id. at 70844.
65. Bernard M. Plum, Exchange Liability Under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act: The
Plaintiff Problem, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 113–14 (1978).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2012).
67. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70847.
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securities exchanges and encouraged their growth outside of the regulatory
framework set for exchanges.68
Regulation ATS allowed systems meeting the exemptions to decide
whether to register as a national securities exchange or as a broker-dealer.69
Rule 3a1-1 of the regulation allows ATS to avoid being considered
“exchanges” and subject to the regulatory requirements associated with the
label.70 Under Regulation ATS, a system with less than five percent of the
trading volume in all securities it trades is only required to file a notice of
operation and quarterly reports with the SEC, maintain records including an
audit trail of transactions, and refrain from using misleading labels such as
“exchange” or “stock market.”71 Only when an ATS exceeds five percent of
the daily volume of a security does it have to disseminate its best price
quotes to the national exchanges.72
C. REGULATIONNMS
In 2005, the SEC adjusted its focus from competition among exchanges
and ATSs to the competition among individual market orders.73 The SEC
adopted Regulation NMS to address the shortfalls in the regulation of the
national market system over the last thirty years, which largely ignored the
handling of orders placed by investors.74 It recognized that the national
market system was designed to promote fair competition among individual
markets while assuring that all of these markets were linked together in a
unified system that promoted interaction among orders.75 But it also
acknowledged there were issues caused by the competition among multiple
markets trading in the same stocks.76 The competition between market
centers can detract from competition among individual orders in the same
stock and impede efficient price discovery and increase costs for orders of
all sizes.77 Regulation NMS, therefore, sought to decrease cost for investors
by increasing liquidity and market depth.78 Prior to the regulation,
institutional investors were able to use strategies that kept their orders secret
in order to avoid market exploitation.79 Regulation NMS, however, required
68. Laura S. Unger, Comm’r, SEC, Address at the Baruch Conference: Regulation of U.S.
Equity Markets: Implications for Innovation, Competition, & Efficiency (Mar. 17, 1999).
69. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70847.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. NMS is in reference to the national market system. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496,
37497 (June 29, 2005).
74. Id. at 37499.
75. Id. at 37501.
76. Id. at 37499.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Roberta Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP. L. 849, 892
(2012).
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registered national exchanges to aggregate and publicize all quotes.80 This
forced broker-dealers to execute trades at the best price.81 Regulation NMS,
along with stock price decimalization, made cloaking trades on national
exchanges virtually impossible.82
The first issue Regulation NMS sought to protect against was the
occurrence of trade-throughs.83 Before Regulation NMS, if institutional
investors wanted to trade a large block of stock, they could offer a lower
price than the market in order to entice a quick execution.84 This act of
“trading-through” the market price helped institutional investors execute
their trades, but there was concern that smaller investors willing to display
their orders were being passed over.85 Regulation NMS attempted to fix this
by requiring investors to get the best price available among displayed price
quotations, which were immediately available for execution.86 No longer
could trades be executed at inferior prices, regardless of the reason.87 This
made it more difficult for large institutional investors to trade in public
markets because their orders would have to be displayed at the risk of
moving the market.88
The second concern of Regulation NMS was fair access. Rule 610 of
the regulation prohibits exchanges from imposing discriminatory terms that
would prevent access and set a general limit on fees that trading centers
could charge for accessing their quotations.89 This allowed ATSs, which use
the displayed public price for their own price quotes, to ensure they would
not be discriminated against by the exchanges.90 It also guaranteed them the
same access as other trading centers and limited the fees they would have to
pay for the access.91 Regulation NMS also required quotes to be displayed
to all market participants unless the quotes were displayed to only one other
person.92 Regulation NMS allowed dark pools and other ATSs fair and
unfettered access to public information.93 But whereas the exchanges were
forced to provide this information, dark pools were not.94
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37501.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 37496. See also GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21871, TRADE-
THROUGH RULE REFORM: THE SEC’SDEPTH OF BOOKALTERNATIVE (2005).
87. SHORTER, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37496.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 37502 (Access Rule).
93. See id. at 37548–50.
94. See generally id.
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The effect of Regulation NMS was to push institutional investors to
private ATSs where the regulation did not apply.95 Institutional investors
had to look for new ways to hide their trades and they found a solution in
Regulation ATS. 96
II. CONCERN SURROUNDING DARK POOLS
Since the adoption of the 1975 Amendments, the SEC has been
mandated to keep markets competitive, fair, and efficient.97 But as trading
has increased in dark pools, accounting for nearly fifteen percent of the
overall trading volume, concern has grown.98 In particular, regulators are
concerned about transparency and price discovery, fragmentation, fair
access, and the lack of knowledge about what actually happens in the dark
pools.99
A. TRANSPARENCY AND PRICEDISCOVERY
The first major concern surrounding dark pools is their lack of
transparency and the impact it has on price discovery.100 Price discovery is a
function of supply and demand.101 As supply and demand fluctuates, prices
adjust accordingly.102 Transparency refers to how much information about
the market investors have access to.103 The price discovery function of the
markets relies on the transparency of the supply and demand for individual
stocks.104 The national market system was established with the hope that
investors would know the true supply and demand for a particular stock at a
particular price.105 Prior to the establishment of the national market system
in the 1970’s, there was little transparency between national stock
exchanges,106 which caused an adverse impact on price discovery.107 While
this is no longer an issue (as the exchanges are required to publicly display
the best prices and investors are required to get the best price), there is
concern that dark pools are masking the true supply and demand.108 As
95. See generally Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 61208, 61209
(proposed Nov. 13, 2009); Karmel, supra note 79, at 892.
96. Karmel, supra note 79, at 892.
97. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 112 (amended 1975).
98. Albinus, supra note 3.
99. Nathaniel Popper, Regulators Fret over Rise of Trading in the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 2013, at B1. See also INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, ISSUES RAISED BY DARK LIQUIDITY 5
(2010) [hereinafter ISSUES RAISED BYDARK LIQUIDITY].
100. Brigagliano statement, supra note 7, at 59.
101. Price Discovery, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pricediscovery.asp
(last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
102. Id.
103. Brigagliano statement, supra note 7, at 59–60.
104. Hatheway statement, supra note 11, at 61.
105. ISSUES RAISED BYDARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 99.
106. Levitt statement, supra note 34.
107. Id.
108. ISSUES RAISED BYDARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 99, at 19.
580 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 9
more trades move into the dark, this could further inhibit the price
discovery.109
Pre-trade price display is essential to the price discovery process.110 As
prices are displayed, it allows participants to determine whether they want
to buy or sell that particular stock at that particular price.111 If the other side
is not interested in making the transaction, the displayed order may have to
adjust or wait for someone willing to execute at that price to come along.112
If a trade is being executed in a dark pool that otherwise should have been
traded on the public markets, the true supply and demand for that stock is
not captured by the public price quote. As more trading is done in the dark,
the concern is that the public markets will not effectively display the true
supply and demand in the markets.113 This could create wider trading
spreads, increase volatility and have adverse effects on investors.114
B. FRAGMENTATION
The second major concern for regulators is market fragmentation.115
Fragmentation occurs when supply and demand does not find each other
because of barriers between them.116 As competition increases and more
trading systems appear, the supply and demand for stocks is spread across
multiple venues that may not be connected.117 An order in one venue may
not have a matching order in that same venue and may have to search other
venues to execute the trade,118 which could increase the cost of execution.119
It could also stop the trade from being executed if a match cannot be
found.120 While fragmentation is caused by more than just dark pools, the
increased use of such venues causes further fragmentation.121
C. FAIRACCESS
Third, regulators are concerned with fair access to trading platforms.122
Because dark pools are run by broker-dealers, only customers and those
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Hatheway statement, supra note 11, at 9–10.
114. John McCrank, U.S. Securities Watchdog Proposes New Rules for “Dark Pools”,
REUTERS (Oct 1, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/01/regulation-darkpools-finra-
idUSL1N0HR22X20131001.
115. Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at IOSCO Technical Committee Conference
(Oct. 8, 2009) (transcript available at SEC.com).
116. See generally ISSUES RAISED BYDARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 99, at 20.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Shapiro, supra note 115.
122. James A. Brigagliano, Deputy Dir., Div. of Trading & Markets, SEC, Keynote Speech of
the SIFMA Dark Pool Symposium (Jan. 21, 2010).
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who are granted access to the pools are allowed to trade in them.123 Not
only does this add to market fragmentation, but it also runs counter to the
SEC’s promotion of fair access in Regulation NMS and the 1975
Amendments.124 While dark pools and ATSs in general constitute a service
that the broker-dealers provide for their customers and are not obliged to
follow the rule of fair access that exchanges follow,125 regulators are
concerned with who and why these firms grant access.126 There is also
concern about who has access to information about liquidity within the
pools, raising concern of a “two-tiered” market where participants in certain
ATSs are privy to information that others are not.127
D. RULES ANDCONDUCT
Lastly, regulators are concerned about the rules and conduct of the dark
pools.128 Because they are regulated as broker-dealer functions and not as
exchanges, they are not required to report such things as its users, the rules
governing the pools, or how the pools work.129 There is no oversight as to
how the operators monitor and prevent fraud, and it is unknown whether the
customers in the pools are fully aware of the rules and consequences of
their trading.130 Without oversight or knowledge of how the pools function,
some participants may be unfairly disadvantaged for not knowing the “rules
of the game.”131
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
A. CANADA
As trading volume has increased in dark pools, international regulatory
agencies have begun to take action to stem the tide. Canada’s regulatory
agencies were the first to specifically address issues with dark pools.132 In
2009, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada
123. Brigagliano statement, supra note 7, at 57–60 (discussing non-public prices and barriers to
entry).
124. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496 (June 29, 2005); Securities Act Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 94 (amended 1975).
125. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844, 70845
(Dec. 22, 1998).
126. Brigagliano statement, supra note 7, at 59–60.
127. See ISSUES RAISED BY DARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 99, at 20–23; Brigagliano statement,
supra note 7, at 59.
128. ISSUES RAISED BYDARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 99, at 20–23.
129. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70845.
130. ISSUES RAISED BYDARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 99, at 20–23.
131. Id. at 21–22.
132. While Canada was the first to implement regulation to limit the use of dark pools, other
regulatory agencies around the world, including the SEC, expressed concerns about their use and
proposed regulations. See JOINT CAN. SEC. ADMIN./INV. INDUS. REGULATORY ORG. OF CAN.,
DARK LIQUIDITY IN THE CANADIANMARKET (2010).
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(IIROC)133 and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA)134 solicited
comments from industry leaders regarding dark pools and the issues
surrounding them in the Canadian markets.135 Although, at the time, only
two dark pools operated in Canada, and rules and regulations were already
implemented, the IIROC and CSA recognized the shift of the securities
industry away from a centralized marketplace to one with many competing
marketplaces.136 Concerned about efficient and effective markets, the CSA
and IIROC identified liquidity, transparency, price discovery, fairness, and
integrity as major concerns surrounding dark pools.137
Acknowledging the limited activity in dark pools and little to no
evidence that dark liquidity was having a negative impact on the Canadian
capital market,138 the CSA and IIROC still approved regulatory
amendments regarding dark pools.139 These amendments included requiring
price improvement over the visible market price for orders executed in dark
pools140 and giving visible orders priority over dark orders on the same
marketplace.141 They also set limits on sending Canadian orders to the
133. “The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada is the national self-
regulatory organization which oversees all investment dealers and trading activity on debt and
equity marketplaces in Canada.” About IIROC, IIROC,
http://www.iiroc.ca/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
134. “The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is an umbrella organization of Canada’s
provincial and territorial securities regulators whose objective is to improve, coordinate and
harmonize regulation of the Canadian capital markets.” About CSA, SECURITIES-
ADMINISTRATORS.CA, http://www.securities-
administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=45&linkidentifier=id&itemid=45 (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
135. See JOINT CAN. SEC. ADMIN./INV. INDUS. REGULATORY ORG. OF CAN., DARK POOLS,
DARK ORDERS, AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN MARKET STRUCTURE IN CANADA (2009)
[hereinafter CANADIAN SECURITIESADMINISTRATORDARK POOL PAPER].
136. Dark pool trading in Canada accounted for only two percent of the total volume at the time
of the regulation. Volume has since rebounded and now accounts for approximately five percent
of the total volume of shares traded in the Canadian markets. Id. at 139; News Release, Canadian
Sec. Admin. & Inv. Indus. Regulatory Org. of Canada, Update on Forum to Discuss CSA/IIROC
Joint Consultation Paper 23-404 “Dark Pools, Dark Orders and Other Developments in Market
Structure in Canada” and Next Steps (May 28, 2010); INV. INDUS. REGULATORY ORG. OF
CAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2013-2014 4 (2014).
137. CANADIAN SECURITIESADMINISTRATORDARK POOL PAPER, supra note 135.
138. JOINT CANADIAN SEC. ADMIN./INV. INDUS. REGULATORY ORG. OF CANADA, STAFF
NOTICE 23-311: REGULATORY APPROACH TO DARK LIQUIDITY IN THE CANADIAN MARKET
(2011).
139. One independent study found that the ten percent dark trading volume that Canada
experiences actually improves liquidity, lowers quotes, and that dark trading is “economically
meaningful”. SEAN FOLEY AND TĀLIS J. PUTNIŅŠ, Should We be Afraid of the Dark? Dark
Trading and Market Quality, CAPITAL MARKETS CRC 3 (2013); Press Release, CSA and IIROC
Announce The Implementation of Dark Liquidity Framework in Canada (Apr. 13, 2012).
140. Exemptions include orders above fifty trading units (typically 5,000 shares), orders that
have a value of $100,000 or more, and “if entering the order based on market conditions would
not be in the interest of the client.” INV. INDUS. REGULATORY ORG. OF CAN., PROVISIONS
RESPECTINGDARK LIQUIDITY 11 n.13 (2012).
141. Id. at 12.
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United States that trade in dark pools.142 Within months, these regulations,
which took effect in October 2012, reduced dark pool trading in Canada by
almost a third.143
B. AUSTRALIA
Following Canada’s lead, the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC)144 implemented regulations for dark pools, including a
better price provision.145 Citing concerns over an increased proportion of
liquidity being diverted from pre-trade transparent orders to dark pools,
which could result in wider spreads and worse prices for investors, ASIC
proposed to establish regulations that would preserve the pre-trade price
formation process.146
Although ASIC acknowledged that the situation in the Australian
markets had not reached a point where price formation was being harmed,
they expressed concern about the speed at which dark liquidity was
increasing and the impact of a potential shift of liquidity from light to dark
venues.147 ASIC adopted amendments to its Market Integrity Rules which
focused on maintaining dark pools for institutional investors with large
orders while maximizing pre-trade transparency in the public markets and
prioritizing lit orders over dark orders.148 The adoption included meaningful
price improvement for dark orders over the displayed price and setting a
minimum size for dark orders.149 Like Canada, the intention of the rule was
to push all dark trading done at the national best bid and offer price to the lit
markets and out of the dark, therefore requiring trades done without pre-
trade transparency to have a “‘good reason’” not to be transparent.150
142. Id. at 11 n.13; Nicholas Thadaney, Policing the Dark: Likely Impacts of New Canadian
Regulation, THE BLOTTER (Nov. 30, 2013),
http://itg.com/news_events/insights/Blotter_Thadaney_042512.pdf.
143. Popper, supra note 99.
144. ASIC is Australia’s independent Commonwealth Government regulatory body set up
under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (ASIC Act). The ASIC Act
requires ASIC, among other things, to “maintain, facilitate and improve the performance of the
financial system” and “promote confident and informed participation by investors . . . in the
financial system.” Our Role, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N,
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Our+role?openDocument (last visited Nov. 1,
2013).
145. AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, ASIC MARKET INTEGRITY RULES (COMPETITION IN
EXCHANGE MARKETS) (2011) [hereinafter MARKET INTEGRITY RULES]; AUSTL. SEC. & INV.
COMM’N, AUSTRALIAN EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE: FURTHER PROPOSALS (2011) [hereinafter
FURTHER PROPOSALS], available at http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-
document/consultation-papers/cp-168-australian-equity-market-structure-further-proposals/.
146. FURTHER PROPOSALS, supra note 145, at 99–100, 104, 117.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 98; MARKET INTEGRITY RULES, supra note 145.
149. MARKET INTEGRITYRULES, supra note 145, at 34–40.
150. Ofir Gefen, What’s the Meaning [& Impact] of “Meaningful Price Improvement”?, THE
BLOTTER (June 27, 2013), http://www.itg.com/2013/06/28/whats-the-meaning-and-impact-of-
meaningful-price-improvement/.
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While the volume of trading in dark pools has not fallen after the
amendments went into effect, the composition of the trades has changed.151
The volume of block sized trades in dark pools increased from 10% to over
18%, while below block sized trading volume decreased from over 14%
down to 10%.152 Spreads have also been impacted although immaterially.153
These outcomes suggest that the amendments had the desired effect of
pushing smaller orders back into the lit market but had little impact on
market prices.154
C. EUROPE
Similarly, the European Union is looking at broad market regulation
that would encompass dark pools. The Market in Financial Instruments
Directive II (MiFID II) has sought to provide more transparency in the dark
pool markets.155 In 2007, the European Union introduced the first set of
rules in the original MiFID to “enhance investor protection, improve cross-
border market access and promote competition in the financial markets
across the EU.”156 These rules “tore down barriers to competition in trading
by ending exchange monopolies, allowing rival venues like dark pools to
flourish.”157 However, while the first MiFID has achieved its objective of
increased competition, it has had the unintended consequence of market
fragmentation and poor post-trade transparency from trades being spread
over various trading venues, including dark pools.158 Trading in dark pools
accounted for nearly 6% of all European shares traded toward the end of
2014 and exceeded $6.2 billion per day.159 The new rules implement a
mechanism for price improvement on shares traded in the dark similar to
rules already implemented in Canada and Australia.160 Further, MiFID II
151. AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, REPORT 331: DARK LIQUIDITY AND HIGH-FREQUENCY
TRADING 6 (2013) (noting that dark trading remained close to thirty percent of the total
equity share volume and that block sized trading had increased).
152. AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, REVIEW OF RECENT RULE CHANGES AFFECTING DARK
LIQUIDITY 10 (2014).
153. Id. at 11.
154. Id.
155. Tom Fairless, EU Agrees on Tighter Oversight of ‘Dark Pools’, WALL ST. J. (June 17,
2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323566804578551611131832702.
156. Barnabas Reynolds, A Changing Landscape: The MiFID II Legislative Proposal, HARV.
LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Nov. 22, 2011, 9:36 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/11/22/a-changing-landscape-the-mifid-ii-legislative-
proposal/.
157. European Regulators May Take Swift Action on ‘Dark Pools’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2009,
5:21 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/eu-regulators-may-take-swift-action-on-dark-
pools/.
158. CITY OF LONDON ECON. DEV., UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OFMIFID (2010).
159. John Detrixhe, Dark-Pool Trading Sets Records in Europe as Rules Change, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-03/dark-pool-trading-sets-
records-in-europe-as-rules-change.
160. Council Regulation 600/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 84, 102 (implementing a midpoint price
requirement).
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implements a volume cap of 4% on any single security on a single market
and an 8% volume cap in a single stock across all venues in the European
Union.161 Final technical requirements are expected in mid-2015 and will
apply to firms in 2017.162
IV. U.S. APPROACH
Until recently, dark pools and ATSs in general have largely flown
under the regulators’ radar. While regulations such as Regulation ATS and
NMS have focused on ATSs and have helped to increase their influence in
the markets, few have focused on curtailing their trading or increasing their
transparency.163 Litigation and enforcement regarding dark pools have
revolved around cases where the pools were not dark enough and either
revealed client information or traded against them.164 But recent events,
including the flash crash,165 have brought renewed concentration on how
dark pools operate.166 Since dark pools are only required to report trades
that are actually executed and little is known about how they operate or who
executes the trades, there is concern about investor protections.167 These
secretive aspects, as well as heavy lobbying by exchanges and regulation
being adopted around the world, have brought dark pools to the
headlines.168
A. EARLIER PROPOSALS
In its approach to dark pool regulation, the SEC has tried to strike a
balance between promoting a transparent, fair, and efficient market system
while fostering competition and innovation between market participants.169
Unlike international efforts, the SEC’s proposals have focused less on
161. Id. at 103.
162. Id. at 104, 148.
163. Unger, supra note 68 (noting that dark pools are largely out of the regulatory control).
164. See, e.g., SEC Charges Boston-Based Dark Pool Operator For Failing To Protect
Confidential Information, SEC NEWS DIGEST (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171485204#.VMK9GIrF8WU.
165. CFTC& SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THEMARKET EVENTSOFMAY 6, 2010 1 (2010).
On May 6, 2010, the prices of many U.S.-based equity products experienced an
extraordinarily rapid decline and recovery. That afternoon, major equity indices in both
the futures and securities markets, each already down over 4% from their prior-day
close, suddenly plummeted a further 5-6% in a matter of minutes before rebounding
almost as quickly.
Id.
166. Shapiro, supra note 115.
167. See generally id. (remarks on dark pools); How Dark Are Dark Pools?—Part 2, TABB
FORUM (Apr. 24, 2013), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/how-dark-are-dark-pools-part-2.
168. See Eleni Himaras, U.S. Should Watch Australia Dark Pool Laws, Schapiro Says,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-21/u-s-should-watch-
australia-dark-pool-laws-schapiro-says.html; Patterson, supra note 1.
169. Brigagliano, supra note 122.
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limiting the use of dark pools and have instead focused on improving data
transparency, providing fairer access, and limiting market fragmentation.170
The SEC’s first proposals sought to enforce the regulation of dark pools
by addressing pool operator practices that create a “‘two-tiered”’ market,
which allowed some investors access to more information than others.171 It
also hoped to increase market transparency by lowering the trading volume
threshold for publicly displayed quotes set in Regulation ATS.172 Under
Regulation ATS, dark pools are not required to display their orders publicly
unless the trading volume of a particular stock reaches five percent or more
of average daily trading volume.173 The SEC proposed to lower the
threshold to 0.25%,174 which would have pushed dark orders into the public
for all except the most highly liquid stocks.175
Additionally, the SEC proposed to eliminate actionable “Indications of
Interest” (IOI).176 IOIs allow one dark pool to signal to other pools or
investors with access that there is an order that needs to be filled for a
certain stock.177 This creates liquidity for the pool and its investors, but it
also takes away from the public markets by routing orders away from the
national market system and into another dark pool.178 While the quantity,
price and even whether the order is a buy or sell is not given, these orders
still only allow those with privileged access to take advantage of such a
feature and create a “two-tiered system.”179
Lastly, the SEC proposed real-time reporting for ATSs that would
identify which venue the trade took place.180 Although ATSs must report
their trades to the public markets, the report does not reveal which ATS
executed the trade.181 The SEC hoped this proposal would help investors
identify sources of liquidity in particular stocks, allowing them to more
easily execute their trades.182 It would also assure that reliable ATS trading
volume was publicly available.183
170. Fact Sheet Strengthening the Regulation of Dark Pools, SEC (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-223-fs.htm.
171. Brigagliano statement, supra note 7, at 59.
172. Brigagliano, supra note 122.
173. Id.
174. Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 61208, 61210 (proposed Nov. 13,
2009).
175. Id.
176. Brigagliano, supra note 122.
177. Schumpeter, supra note 57.
178. Brigagliano, supra note 122.
179. Schumpeter, supra note 57.
180. Brigagliano, supra note 122.
181. Sam Mamudi, Dark Pools Face New FINRA Disclosure Requirements, BLOOMBERG (Oct
1, 2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-01/dark-pools-face-new-finra-
disclosure-requirements.html.
182. Brigagliano, supra note 122.
183. Id.
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B. RECENTDEVELOPMENTS
While the SEC and other U.S. regulators have been taking a measured
approach to regulations by trying to improve transparency and gather
information about the pools before they make final decisions, the national
stock exchanges are pushing for stricter rules, if not a complete ban on dark
pool trading.184 Although there has been no concrete evidence that dark
pools or any other type of ATS are impacting the markets, exchanges
continue to express concern.185 They argue that dark pools shift liquidity
away from the lit markets, widen spreads and decrease execution quality.
As exchanges, they are required to keep a liquid market that accurately
reflects the supply and demand as part of the national market system.186 But
because the dark pools are not required to show trade information until after
they are executed, the exchanges argue that the quote on the national market
system may not reflect real supply and demand, denying the market
participants a clear view of trading interest.187 Exchanges want the SEC to
prioritize the public exchanges over the private ATSs.188 They support the
proposed lowering of the threshold limit for publicly displayed quotes in
ATSs to 0.25% of the trading volume.189
While there are concerns about market integrity and protecting
investors, stock exchanges are also concerned with the rise in dark pool
trading because of the negative impact dark pools have on their business.190
Exchanges are no longer private companies. Most are public corporations
and competitors to dark pools.191 Stock exchanges are paid for shares traded
on their exchanges.192 The more volume, the more money the exchanges
make. The rise of dark pools affects their business model by reducing
volume.193 While dark pools and other trading systems pay for access to
public quotes, which they rely on to price the securities within their own
pools, the access fee allowed to be charged is capped.194
184. Marcinek & Kisling, supra note 12.
185. Id.; Hatheway statement, supra note 11, at 9–10.
186. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 111-12 (amended 1975).
187. Schumpeter, supra note 57.
188. Hatheway statement, supra note 11, at 62.
189. Id. at 62.
190. John McCrank, Nasdaq Profits Hurt by Facebook IPO Costs, Dark Trading, REUTERS
(Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/nasdaq-results-
idUSL2N0DB0N320130424.
191. Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High Frequency Trading, and Other Market Structure Issues:
Hearing Before the S. Banking Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous.
and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) 69 [hereinafter Mathisson statement] (statement by Dan
Mathisson, Head of U.S. Equities Trading, Credit Suisse).
192. Jacob Bunge, Exchange Executives to Push for Dark-Pool Restrictions, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
8, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324504704578411451706113258.
193. McCrank, supra note 190.
194. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496, 37502 (June 29, 2005).
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Dark pool operators contend that they supply a need for institutional
investors who are continuously the victims of poaching from HFT.195
Exchanges have embraced HFT to create liquidity196 and have given HFT
unique access to their quotes and special order types that have allowed them
to detect large orders and execute in front of them.197 The increase in high
frequency trading has made it harder for institutional traders to trade in the
lit market even when the trade is broken into pieces.198
Pool operators also point to the fact that exchanges themselves operate
dark pools and hide orders just as broker-dealer pools do.199 The NYSE’s
own advertisement for its dark service say’s it trades “over 500 million
shares of dark liquidity, daily,” which would represent about thirty-seven
percent of the exchange’s trading volume.200
Rather than lowering the trading volume threshold under Regulation
ATS from 5% to 0.25% as proposed by the SEC, some pool operators want
the volume threshold limitations removed altogether.201 This would have
the advantage of increasing competition in the market by giving all
investors the opportunity to trade in the dark and reducing the “two-tiered”
market information system currently present.202 However, the increased
competition could also increase market fragmentation and price discovery
issues by further separating buyers and sellers among even more market
venues.203
While the earlier attempts to address dark pool concerns were
unsuccessful, the recent adoption of dark pool regulation in the international
community, along with a surge in dark trading volume, and heavy lobbying
by the national exchanges, has renewed interest in dark pools.204 FINRA has
focused recent efforts on bringing more transparency to dark pools.205
Under its amended rules, each ATS is required to report weekly volume and
number of securities transactions within the ATS to FINRA.206 ATSs are
195. Mathisson statement, supra note 191, at 69.
196. Nathan D. Brown, The Rise of High Frequency Trading: The Role Algorithms, and the
Lack of Regulations, Play in Today’s Stock Market, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 209 (2011).
197. PATTERSON, supra note 53, at 282.
198. JONATHAN A. BROGAARD ET AL., HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON
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also required to obtain a unique identification number.207 Using the ATSs
unique identification number, FINRA will publish the total number of
shares traded each week in each ATS with the hope on making dark pools
more transparent and enhance FINRA’s ability to monitor ATS compliance
with Regulation ATS.208
While FINRA has focused its attention on making dark pools more
transparent, the SEC has stepped up its enforcement efforts. These include
heavy fines and penalties on operators for unfair practices, failure to protect
confidential trading information, and executing trades at inferior prices to
the market price.209 These efforts along with market conditions have forced
some dark pools to close and others to consider closing.210
V. RECOMMENDATION
Any further approach to dark pool regulation needs to promote greater
competition among participants rather than hinder it. While there are clear
concerns about the potential for the national market system to be affected
by an increase in dark pool trading, there is no clear evidence showing it is
currently happening. The SEC should encourage the innovation and
competition that has guided their regulatory approach since the 1975
Amendments and in its adoption of Regulation ATS and Regulation NMS.
The adoption of the better price system implemented in Canada and
Australia will only make the U.S. stock markets less competitive. Knowing
that HFTs will be unable or unwilling to trade in the dark may drive more
institutional trades to the dark.211 This will divide the market further, with
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one segment of institutional investors trading in the dark and retail and
high-frequency traders trading on exchanges.
Rather than curtailing dark pools, regulators need to focus on fair
access throughout the markets. Dark pools were borne out of the need of
institutional traders to shield their trading activity from predatory trading
practices made available by advances in technology. Any solution that does
not address these concerns will only be a patch for a larger problem.
Enforcement action should continue to be taken against pool operators
who violate price rules of Regulation NMS or discriminate against users of
the pool. But rather than trying to isolate dark pools, regulations should
encourage more connectedness between the pools and exchanges. The SEC
should revise the Regulation ATS access rule to prohibit dark pools from
discriminating against who they trade with and set up a system that links
multiple trading centers and provides information to the public.
CONCLUSION
Through Regulations ATS and NMS, the SEC has fostered innovation
in the stocks markets while recognizing the need to protect fair and efficient
access for all investors. While the international community has looked to
limit the use of dark pools, the SEC has thus far taken a cautious approach.
Any attempt to further regulate dark pools without fully knowing the
consequences is premature and ill-advised. While enforcement of access
and pricing rules should continue, a broader view of the market
implications needs to be taken. Therefore, the SEC’s focus should be on fair
access throughout the markets and not just dark pools.
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